

## A New Model of Interpersonal Influence Characteristics

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A reformulation of social influence theory is presented as a taxonomy, decision tree, and glossary of key terms. Types of social influence are sorted on the basis of four "Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinctions": (a) level of cognitive processing (conscious vs. nonconscious); (b) perceived intentionality (intentional vs. unintentional vs. orthogonal/irrelevant); (c) relative social status (high vs. peer vs. low vs. orthogonal/irrelevant); and (d) direction of change (positive vs. negative vs. orthogonal/irrelevant). Nonconscious influence (low level of processing) includes affective evaluation (attraction, repulsion), schema/norm activation, echo and hysterical contagion, social facilitation, social loafing, and unlearned social responses. Intentional influence (compliance/anticompliance) includes obedience, rebellion, direct conformity and anticonformity, and power-of-the-powerless. Unintentional influence (imitation/anti-imitation) includes indirect conformity and anticonformity, identification, and disinhibitory contagion. A residual set of influence types includes reactance, informational influence, and direct and vicarious learning. New definitions of social influence terms were derived deductively from the four Influence Distinctions. The reformulation suggests several possible directions for future research and poses at least as many interesting empirical questions as it answers.

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Social influence is one of the most historically central and widely studied areas in modern social psychology. Further, there is remarkable consensus among social psychologists regarding the terms and concepts that should be indexed under that heading. (For the purpose of simplicity, the terms *social influence* and *interpersonal influence* are used interchangeably in this article.)

Theories of social influence have sometimes taken the form of taxonomies that classify acts of social influence. The two classic taxonomies are Kelman's (1958, 1961) compliance-identification-internalization trichotomy and French and Raven's six bases of social power: coercive, reward, legitimate, referent, expert, and informational (French, 1956; French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965). Notwithstanding significant updates and extensions of the power bases approach (e.g., Raven, 1992, 1993), many authors seem content to rest on the laurels of social psychology's classic conceptualizations. However, our reliance on these tried-and-true formulations of social influence is not without problems.

#### Problems in Distinguishing Social Influence from Other Topics in Social Psychology

When one peruses the "Social Influence" chapter in introductory social psychology textbooks, or the topics indexed under that heading in *Psychological Abstracts*, the logical, conceptual basis on which social influence is distinguished from other topics in social psychology is far from clear. In fact, according to Jones (1985), social psychology can almost be defined as the study of social influence. Similarly, Worchel, Cooper, and Goethals (1988) state:

In its broadest sense, social influence includes almost all of social psychology. It can be thought of as any change, whether physiological, attitudinal, emotional, or behavioral, that occurs in one person as the result of the real, implied, or imagined presence of others (Latané, 1981). For our purposes, however, we will define social influence more narrowly... (p. 523)

We agree that the theories and findings traditionally classified under social influence require a definition substantially more restricted than the seemingly reasonable "broadest sense" definition above — which clearly borrows from Allport's (1954) classic definition of social psychology, namely, "...an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others" (p. 5). However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a way to specify the rules by which social influence phenomena are defined as a subset within the larger domain of contemporary social psychology. Attribution, impression formation, impression management, attitude formation and change, per-

suasion, reactance, attraction, altruism, aggression, vicarious learning, conformity, obedience, compliance, contagion, group dynamics, interdependence, leadership, conflict, stereotyping, prejudice, social norms, and social facilitation are discriminable; but in what sense is one "social influence" and another not?

#### Problems in Distinguishing Among Concepts Within the Traditional Sphere of Social Influence

The fact that the community of social psychologists generally agrees that topics traditionally placed under the social influence rubric can be discriminated does not mean that there is consensus on *how* they are to be discriminated. Further, the apparent consensus in the social influence literature is, in large measure, illusory. A careful examination of such terms as compliance, conformity, and obedience reveals a distressing lack of consensus regarding the use of the area's most central and fundamental concepts. Definitions have been vague, inconsistent and often times contradictory. To take one example, "compliance" has been defined as: "a change in behavior due to a direct request from another person" (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1997, p. 295); "public congruence accompanied by continued private disagreement with the [influence] source's position" (Nail, 1986, p. 195); and a situation in which "agreement is obtained through force, promise of reward, or threat of punishment" (Corsini, 1994, p. 298). (In this regard, see also Cialdini & Trost, 1998.)

#### A WORKING MODEL OF INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE

Considering the above arguments, we have undertaken a reconceptualization of the social influence literature. We initially sought to identify a set of key theoretical concepts and terms in the literature and then to construct a system with which they could be rationally and deductively derived and distinguished. Our dependence on the seminal, 1950s' taxonomies of social influence as well as Raven's (1992) updated model will be obvious. In so far as possible, we attempted to capture the often blurred consensus we think that we have uncovered in the literature on social influence. We have tried to use the old terms and minimize the number of new ones. The tasks of developing (a) a set of conceptually distinguishable concepts and (b) a rational system to distinguish them have been our primary goals.

Our style of theorizing differs somewhat from traditional social influence taxonomies. We have proposed a set of core, elemental characteristics that can be combined into various clusters in order to define the much larger set of terms that appear in discussions of interpersonal



influence. All theories must make predictions; but, in contrast with the goals of prior approaches (B.H. Raven, personal communication, August 24, 1997; see also Raven, 1993), we did not seek to develop a taxonomy that could be used primarily to classify real-world examples of social influence into discrete, mutually exclusive categories. Thus we have not followed in the tradition of the naturalists who classify real-life plants and animals. A closer parallel in the physical sciences might be the periodic table of chemical elements—in which most real-world examples are interpreted and understood as additive clusters or compounds and synergistic combinations (analogical to “molecules”) of the basic conceptual elements.

The principal criterion for inclusion in our model was the identification of the fewest number of elemental characteristics (or “sorting variables”) that would best differentiate the greatest number of types of social influence in the literature. On this basis, we arrived at a set of four “Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinctions”: (a) level of cognitive processing (conscious vs. nonconscious); (b) perceived intentionality (intentional vs. unintentional vs. orthogonal/irrelevant); (c) relative social status (high vs. peer vs. low vs. orthogonal/irrelevant); and (d) direction of change (positive vs. negative vs. orthogonal/irrelevant). The rationale for selecting each of these four attributes is addressed below. To take an example, “obedience” is conceptualized in our model as an act of interpersonal influence in which the influencee: (a) is consciously aware of the influence mechanisms, (b) perceives the influence attempt as intentional, (c) perceives the influence agent as being higher in status, and (d) behaves consistently with the agent’s advocated position.

The working model is presented most parsimoniously as a decision tree (Figure 1), which sorts specific types of interpersonal influence on the basis of these four characteristics. A glossary of definitions for the key terms generated by the model is in the Appendix. This presentation strategy follows from our primary goal—to create a logical, deductive system that rationally partitions and defines key interpersonal influence terms. (Note that the decision tree does not represent a temporal progression of events; rather, it has been constructed to reflect the relative importance of the most salient distinguishing characteristics.)

### Level of Cognitive Processing

The first Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinction is the influencee’s level of cognitive processing (viz., conscious vs. nonconscious), and relates to the influencee’s awareness of (i.e., conscious access to) the influence mechanisms. We were persuaded to select this variable as a central characteristic based on the numerous dual cognitive process models in contemporary social psychology.

During the last several years, a series of theoretical and experimental analyses in cognitive psychology and social cognition have triggered a renaissance of one of Freud’s (1900/1953) basic postulates: There are two distinct mental processes by which data are interpreted — “conscious” and “unconscious.” (In this regard, see Levy, 1997, for a critical analysis of dichotomous versus continuous psychological phenomena.) This contention is supported by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), who concluded that:

...current research in cognitive and social psychology strongly supports the view that at times people engage in “controlled,” “deep,” “effortful,” and/or “mindful” analyses of stimuli, and at other times the analyses are better characterized as “automatic,” “shallow,” “heuristic,” and/or “mindless” (see Craik, 1979; Eagly & Chaiken, 1984; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Langer, 1978; and Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). (p. 11)

In like manner, Bargh (1996) contended that, “...there may be important forms of thought that are not under our control, that are autonomous and detached from our intention...” (p. 169)

Another related theory is contained in Lewicki’s (1986) book, *Nonconscious Social Information Processing*. Lewicki speaks of “complex or ‘high level’ processing of information that is not mediated by conscious awareness” (p. ix) because his data document the rapid assimilation of complex covariance structures with what we term “low” level, nonconscious information processing. Similarly, Gilbert (1991) and Wegner and Bargh (1998) distinguish between automatic and controlled processes.

Petty and Cacioppo (1986) introduced their own, roughly analogous distinction in their Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), within which they differentiate “central and peripheral routes” to attitude change. The fact that social facilitation can be demonstrated even in chickens (Zajonc, 1968) and cockroaches (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969) supports the idea that a low level mechanism of social influence must be discriminated from the impact of a set of reasoned and logical arguments (i.e., a “central route”) in a persuasive communication.

On the one hand, all of these theorists have made distinctions that are related to Freud’s discussions of conscious and unconscious mental life. On the other hand, each of the theories (and their associated sets of supporting data) are discriminably different in several respects. Petty and Cacioppo (1986), for instance, focus exclusively on persuasion, that is, “any change in attitudes that results from exposure to a communication” (pp. 4-5). Thus, the Petty and Cacioppo ELM version of the “level of processing” variable would apply only to that subset of social influence that is mediated by a persuasive communication.







FIGURE 1 Decision Tree for Interpersonal Influence Characteristics (intentionality and social status represent the perceptions of the influence)



It seems unlikely that there is one, and only one, distinction among various types of information processing that is relevant to interpersonal influence. As a result, we have focused on the common ground among these numerous theories—none of which was initially developed with applications to social influence as a major goal. We have chosen to use the terms “level of processing” as well as “conscious” and “nonconscious” in our model because the “conscious-unconscious” jargon has an undesirable connotation for many, primarily due to its foundations in psychoanalytic theory. Our usage of “level of processing” is, however, largely unrelated to Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) use of the same term.

There are at least four criteria that have been used (Bargh, 1996) to distinguish what we are labeling as “conscious” and “nonconscious” processing:

An automatic process was said to be *unintentional* (the individual does not start the process by an act of will), to occur *outside awareness*, to be *uncontrollable* (the individual cannot stop it once it has started....) and to be *efficient* or consume minimal attentional resources... (p. 170)....Most processes of interest to social psychologists have some features of automatic process...and other features of a conscious process... (p. 171)....When boiled down to its essence, what is meant by the term “automatic” is that the process is autonomous, capable of operating by itself without the need for conscious guidance...p. 173)

In the present model, types of nonconscious influence include affective evaluation (e.g., repulsion, attraction; see Berscheid, 1985; Zajonc, 1968), schema/norm activation (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984), echo and hysterical contagion (see Colligan, Pennebaker, & Murphy, 1982; Kerckhoff & Back, 1968), social facilitation (see Zajonc, 1965), social loafing (see Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979), and unlearned social responses (e.g., attachment; see Bowlby, 1969). (Although the definitions of these and other terms presented in the Appendix are not repeated here in the textual exposition for reasons of space limitations, it would be helpful to cross reference both the figure and Appendix while reading the exposition.)

### Perceived Intentionality

The second Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinction is the influencee’s perception of intentionality on the part of the influencer. The tenet that social influence induced by means of the “identification” mechanism does not require a deliberate and open attempt to provoke a response from the influencee has been clear since Kelman’s (1958, 1961) taxonomy. Further, a comprehensive review of the social contagion literature (Levy & Nail, 1993) revealed that intentionality is a key feature in distinguishing contagion from other types of social influence.

On these bases, we concluded that different mechanisms are likely to be involved when an influencee explicitly attributes an interaction as intentionally versus unintentionally motivated. In addition to differentiating “imitation” from other forms of influence, our decision to include intentionality in the model led to the deduction that there are two conformity processes: direct conformity (intentional influence) and indirect conformity (unintentional influence).

As can be seen in Figure 1, intentional influence (“compliance/anticompliance”) includes obedience (see Milgram, 1963, 1974), rebellion, direct conformity and direct anticonformity (see Nail, 1986; Nail & Van Leeuwen, 1993; Willis, 1965), and power-of-the-powerless (see Raven, 1983, 1992). Unintentional influence (“imitation/anti-imitation”) includes indirect conformity (see Asch, 1956) and indirect anticonformity, identification (see Kelman, 1958), and disinhibitory contagion (see Levy, 1992; Levy & Collins, 1989a, 1989b; Levy & Nail, 1993; see also Wheeler, 1966).

There remains a residual set of influence types that are orthogonal to perceived intentionality; that is, they are theorized as conceptually irrelevant to the distinction between intended and unintended influence. These include reactance (see Brehm, 1966), informational influence, and direct and vicarious learning (see Bandura & Walters, 1963).

### Relative Social Status

The third Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinction lies in the relative positions of influencer and influencee in the social hierarchy. We selected this variable because it is the essential feature that distinguishes obedience and rebellion (higher-status influence) from various forms of conformity (peer-status influence). Further, it best differentiates Raven’s (1992) concept of power-of-the-powerless (lower-status influence) from obedience and conformity.

### Direction of Change

The fourth Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinction is direction of change. This characteristic has been in the literature at least since Willis (1965) coined the term *anticonformity*. Our decision to include it in the model is based on the proposition that most types of influence can generate an oppositional response in the influencee. As such, for example, anticonformity and rebellion differ from conformity and obedience essentially in the outcomes they produce. Similarly, this characteristic serves to distinguish positive identification from negative identification and attraction from repulsion. (It should be noted that in the absence of any response, social influence has not, by definition, occurred.)



### Additional Characteristics

The columns to the right in Figure 1 make additional theoretical points about the influence types that are not contained in the decision tree. For example, "internalization" refers to whether the change induced in the influencee results in a relatively stable intrapsychic change (i.e., whether the changes are trans-situational and trans-temporal). In contrast to Kelman (1958), who made internalization a *type* of social influence, we have treated it as a *characteristic* of social influence, which may or may not be associated with any particular influence type.

### CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The present model generates a set of rationally partitioned definitions of the terms most frequently used in the social influence literature. It is more comprehensive than any of the contemporary models of social influence (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987; Montgomery, 1992; Nail, 1986; Nail & Van Leeuwen, 1993), especially considering its power to generate a glossary. Yet, the present model is, in some respects, more interesting for the questions asked than questions answered.

1. There are 72 cells in a full factorial, defined by two levels of cognitive processing (high and low), three levels of perceived intentionality (intentional, unintentional, and orthogonal), four relative social positions of influencer and influencee (higher, peer, lower, and orthogonal), and three directions of change (positive, negative, and orthogonal). Yet, there are only 24 "primary" social influence types represented in Figure 1.

If the present model is analogous to early versions of the periodic table of chemical elements, some of these unidentified cells may point to new, interesting, and distinctive types of social influence. For instance, the model does not include a set of influence types for social status for the lower portion of the figure (nonconscious level of processing) or for conscious-unintentional influence (the middle of the figure). Will the empirical hypotheses implicit in our decision not to make these subdivisions turn out to be true or false? Is the influencer's status irrelevant for unintentional and/or nonconscious influence? Or does the absence of up- and down- status lines in the middle and lower portion Figure 1 suggest a need for new influence types covering, for instance, the unintentional influence of up-status influencers, such as group leaders, media figures, and parents? For example, is the influence process for a sports idol identical in the apparently inadvertent influence of behavior in a game versus the apparently intentional influence in a commercial endorsement? Is the nonconscious influence process of up-status influencers

functionally equivalent to that of down-status influencers, such as minority groups and children? If it turns out that there is a difference when these previously unasked questions are put to empirical test, additional social status "diamonds" in the middle and lower portions of the figure will be required.

2. Some of the influence types listed in Figure 1 represent subdivisions that cannot be distinguished on the basis of our Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinctions. For example, conscious-unintentional-positive influence, which is orthogonal to social status, branches into two types: (a) positive identification and (b) disinhibitory contagion. It has been theorized (see Wheeler, 1966) that intrapsychic, approach-avoidance conflict is a necessary prerequisite for disinhibitory contagion, and Levy's (1992) research lends empirical support for this tenet. Does this mean that interpersonal influence processes are different in kind for individuals who are conflicted versus those who are unconflicted with respect to the substance of the influence? McGuire's (1964) inoculation model might be conceptualized as adding conflict to a previously unconflicted influencee. Should the presence of conflict with respect to the substance of the influence constitute a fifth Fundamental Interpersonal Influence Distinction?

Consider a second example of a set of distinctions for which we have not provided a deductive basis. How are reactance, direct learning, and vicarious learning to be distinguished? The present model does not accomplish this task. Will the rational decision rules necessary to further divide these three subtypes of conscious influence (orthogonal to perceived intentionality, social status, and direction of change) have implications elsewhere in the model?

3. Latané's (1981) social impact theory proposes that the degree of social influence is a function of the strength, immediacy, and number of influencers relative to influencees. Latané (1981) presented impressive support for the theory across a wide variety of influence phenomena such as conformity, imitation, attraction, social loafing, and social facilitation (viz., stage fright), all of which are included in the present model. But do social impact theory's tenets apply equally well to other social influence types identified herein such as power-of-the-powerless, disinhibitory contagion, informational influence, reactance, echo and hysterical contagion, and direct and vicarious learning?

Interestingly, in at least some cases, disinhibitory contagion appears to follow principles that are both unknown and at odds with social impact theory. Three independent studies that investigated the disinhibitory contagion of aggression have found *dissimilar* models to produce greater influence than similar models (Baron & Kepner, 1970; Goethals &



Perlstein, 1978; Wheeler & Levine, 1967). Does this finding apply only to the disinhibition of aggression, or does it apply to other types of contagion as well? If disinhibitory contagion does not follow the laws of social impact theory, what laws does it follow? The interface between different influence phenomena and mathematical models of social influence, such as social impact theory, is potentially fertile and largely unplowed ground for future theory and research.

4. The present model does not incorporate environmental manipulation, reward, punishment (see Raven, 1983, 1992), or the influence resulting from interdependence (see Kelley, 1979; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

5. For the present, we believe that studying Figure 1 and the glossary can greatly enrich one's understanding of social influence phenomena. To cite one example, psychological reactance is widely recognized as an explanatory theory for both behavioral anticonformity and boomerang attitude change (e.g., Nail, 1986, p. 203). According to Brehm (1966), one way to reestablish a threatened freedom is to do the precise opposite of what the influencer advocates. In this sense, reactance can explain both negative behavioral and attitudinal changes. However, according to Figure 1, reactance is *orthogonal* with respect to the *direction* of change, which indicates that reactance can lead to positive, as well as negative, change. Cialdini's field and laboratory research confirms this contention (see Cialdini, 1993, pp. 194-209). Companies and sales organizations frequently use tactics such as the "limited number" technique and the "deadline" technique to entice consumers to purchase products they otherwise might not buy. These techniques encourage consumers to buy now before their freedom to buy is taken away by exhausted supplies or factory-imposed time deadlines.

6. Although we concur with theorists who view "social influence" as roughly equivalent to "social psychology," if the present model is expanded to include all of social psychology, how can the field be relevantly and usefully organized? We argue that it is time for social psychologists to engage in a strategic discussion about how the field should be, ideally, organized and indexed in the twenty-first century. We see this article as an opening salvo in that debate.

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## Appendix

INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE:  
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Guide: 1. Words in italics are cross-referenced (listed separately); 2. syn = synonym; 3. rel. terms = related terms; 4. cf. = compare with.

- AFFECTIVE EVALUATION:** emotion-based reaction or response to a person, event, or other phenomenon. Examples include: *attraction* and *repulsion*. (rel. terms: *nonconscious*)
- ANTICOMPLIANCE:** behavioral *opposition* to a perceived *intentional influence* attempt. Examples include: *rebellion*, *direct anticonformity*, and *counter power-of-the-powerless*. (cf. *compliance*)
- ANTICONFORMITY:** behavioral *opposition* to perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *direct anticonformity*; *indirect anticonformity*) (cf. *conformity*)
- ANTI-IMITATION:** *unintentional influence* resulting in decreased affective, cognitive, or behavioral similarity between an *influencee* and an *influencer*. Examples include: *indirect anticonformity* and *negative identification*. (cf. *imitation*)
- APPROACH-AVOIDANCE CONFLICT:** a *conflict* in which an individual is both drawn toward and repelled by the same goal. (see: *disinhibitory contagion*)
- ATTITUDE CHANGE:** (syn: *persuasion*) (see: *internalization*)
- ATTRACTION:** an *influencee's* positive *affective evaluation* of an *influencer*.
- COMPLIANCE:** behavioral *yielding* to a perceived *intentional influence* attempt. Examples include: *obedience*, *direct conformity*, and *power-of-the-powerless*. (cf. *anticompliance*; *contagion*)
- CONFLICT:** a situation in which an individual experiences opposing forces or *motives*.
- CONFORMITY:** behavioral *yielding* to perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *direct conformity*; *indirect conformity*) (cf. *anticonformity*)
- CONSCIOUS:** the mental state of being aware, attentive, or cognizant. (cf. *nonconscious*)
- CONTAGION:** the spread of affect, cognition, or behavior from an *influencer* to an *influencee* where the influencee does not perceive an *intentional influence* attempt on the part of the influencer. (syn: *imitation*) (rel. terms: *disinhibitory contagion*; *echo contagion*; *hysterical contagion*)

- COUNTER POWER-OF-THE-POWERLESS:** a form of *anticompliance* in which the *influencee* acts in *opposition* to the *legitimate power* of a lower *social status influencer*. (cf. *power-of-the-powerless*)
- COUNTERINFORMATIONAL/BOOMERANG EFFECT:** *social influence* that derives from the persuasive content of a communication wherein *internalization* is in a direction opposite to that of the *influencer's* communication. (cf. *informational influence*)
- DIRECT ANTICONFORMITY:** a form of *anticompliance* in which the *influencee* acts in *opposition* to perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *indirect conformity*; *indirect anticonformity*) (cf. *direct conformity*)
- DIRECT CONFORMITY:** a form of *compliance* in which the *influencee* yields to perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *indirect conformity*; *indirect anticonformity*) (cf. *direct anticonformity*)
- DIRECT LEARNING:** the acquisition of a new response as a consequence of direct experience.
- DISINHIBITORY CONTAGION:** a form of *contagion* in which the *influencee*, who is in an *approach-avoidance conflict*, experiences a reduction of *restraints* as a consequence of observing the *influencer* perform the desired act. The *influencee's* behavior may or may not be an exact *imitation* of the influencer's behavior. (cf. *echo contagion*; *hysterical contagion*)
- ECHO CONTAGION:** a form of *contagion* in which an *unconflicted influencee* spontaneously *imitates* or reflects the affect or behavior of an *influencer*. (cf. *disinhibitory contagion*; *hysterical contagion*)
- HYSTERICAL CONTAGION:** a form of *contagion* involving the spread of physical symptoms from the *influencer* to an *influencee* in the absence of an identifiable pathogen. (cf. *disinhibitory contagion*; *echo contagion*)
- IMITATION:** *unintentional influence* resulting in increased affective, cognitive, or behavioral similarity between an *influencee* and an *influencer*. Examples include: *indirect conformity*, *positive identification*, and *disinhibitory contagion*. (syn: *contagion*) (cf. *anti-imitation*)
- INDIRECT ANTICONFORMITY:** a form of *anti-imitation* in which an *influencee* acts in *opposition* to perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *conformity*; *direct conformity*; *direct anticonformity*) (cf. *indirect conformity*)
- INDIRECT CONFORMITY:** a form of *imitation* in which an *influencee* acts in the direction of perceived peer or group norms. (rel. terms: *conformity*; *direct conformity*; *direct anticonformity*) (cf. *indirect anticonformity*)
- INFLUENCEE:** a target or recipient of *social influence*.
- INFLUENCER:** an agent of *social influence*.



- INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE:** *social influence* that derives from the persuasive content of a communication wherein *internalization* is in the direction of the *influencer's* communication.  
(cf. *counterinformational/boomerang effect*)
- INSTINCTS/UNLEARNED SOCIAL RESPONSES:** inborn predispositions to respond to others. Examples may include: attachment, survival, territoriality, affiliation, sex, aggression, esteem needs.
- INTENTIONAL INFLUENCE:** a form of *social influence* in which the *influencer* deliberately and openly attempts to evoke a particular response in the *influencee*. The assessment of intentionality is based primarily upon the perceptions of the influencee; however, intentionality may also be assessed from the perspective of the influencer or a third-person observer.  
(cf. *unintentional influence*)
- INTERNALIZATION:** a relatively stable modification in an *influencee's* values, beliefs or attitudes.  
(see: *attitude change; persuasion*)
- INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE:**  
(see: *social influence*)
- LEGITIMATE POWER:** a situation in which an individual, by virtue of his/her *social status*, is perceived as having the right to influence others.
- MOTIVE:** an impetus, stimulus, or drive that causes an individual to act; the locus of a motive may be internal or external.
- NEGATIVE IDENTIFICATION:** a form of *anti-imitation* in which an *influencee* adopts the traits, characteristics, or mannerisms that are opposite to those of another individual or group.  
(cf. *positive identification*)
- NONCONSCIOUS:** the mental state of being unaware; information processing that is automatic, rapid, and out of awareness.  
(cf. *conscious*)
- OBEDIENCE:** a form of *compliance* in which the *influencee* yields to perceived *legitimate* authority.  
(cf. *rebellion*)
- OPPOSITION:** behavioral, cognitive, or affective counteraction; a *motive* that is against the direction of an influence attempt; opposition is conceptually *orthogonal* to *internalization*.
- ORTHOGONAL:** independent; uncorrelated; unrelated.
- PERSUASION:** a modification in one's attitude that is the consequence of exposure to a communication.  
(syn: *attitude change*)  
(see: *internalization*)
- POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION:** a form of *imitation* in which an *influencee* adopts the traits, characteristics or mannerisms of another individual or group.  
(cf. *negative identification*)
- POWER-OF-THE-POWERLESS:** a form of *compliance* in which the *influencer's* lower *social status* gives him/her *legitimate* power over the *influencee*.  
(rel. terms: *counter power-of-the-powerless*)
- REACTANCE:** an *internal motive* to protect or restore one's threatened sense of freedom.

- REBELLION:** a form of *anticompliance* in which the *influencee* acts in *opposition* to perceived *legitimate* authority.  
(cf. *obedience*)
- REPULSION:** an *influencee's* negative *affective evaluation* of an *influencer*.
- RESTRAINT:** the inhibition, restriction, or suppression of affect, cognition or behavior due to an internal or external *motive*.  
(rel. terms: *disinhibitory contagion*)
- SCHEMA/NORM ACTIVATION:** the social triggering of an *influencee's* cognitive structures, such as memories, associations, beliefs, values, ideas, expectations, assumptions, or general prior knowledge. Examples include: person schemata, self-schemata, role schemata, event schemata, content-free schemata, and the norms of equity, reciprocity, and social responsibility.
- SOCIAL FACILITATION:** a situation in which the presence of others, as spectators or as co-actors, enhances the emission of the *influencee's* dominant responses.
- SOCIAL LOAFING:** a situation in which individuals exert less effort toward achieving a common goal when performing in a group of co-actors than when performing alone.
- SOCIAL INFLUENCE:** any situation in which an *influencee's* thoughts, feelings, or behaviors are affected by the actual, implied, or imagined presence or actions of one or more *influencers*.  
(syn: *interpersonal influence*)  
(rel. terms: *intentional influence; unintentional influence*)
- SOCIAL STATUS:** a relatively well-defined position, standing, or rank in a social hierarchy.
- UNINTENTIONAL INFLUENCE:** a form of *social influence* in which the *influencer* unwittingly evokes a response in the *influencee*. The assessment of unintentionality is based primarily upon the perceptions of the influencee; however, unintentionality may also be assessed from the perspective of the influencer or a third-person observer.  
(cf. *intentional influence*)
- VICARIOUS LEARNING:** the acquisition of a new response as a consequence of observation.
- YIELDING:** behavioral acquiescence that is in the direction of a *social influence* attempt; yielding is conceptually *orthogonal* to *internalization*.